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Purpose - The article examines the international standards for establishing national jurisdiction over the 
transnational crimes of money laundering and bribery and identifies challenges to the adoption of those standards 
by different States in practice. 
Design/methodology/approach - This article, first, defines transnational money laundering and transnational 
bribery; then, examines the legal bases and principles on which a State can claim criminal jurisdiction over these 
offences. This article also discusses the application of jurisdictional conditions in a transnational context, and how 
to deal with the particular problems arising from national claim of jurisdiction over these offences, e.g., 
jurisdictional concurrence. 
Findings - This paper argues that when the jurisdictional concurrence occurs, the involved States should 
consult one another with taking into account of a number of relevant factors and take the “centre of gravity” 
approach to deciding which state or forum eventually prosecute. States less able to establish jurisdiction over the 
offences are often those which have a weak legal basis and/or insufficient resources. 
Originality/value - This article would be the good guidance on how a State could claim jurisdiction over the 
offences of transnational money laundering and transnational bribery. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic globalization and advanced technologies have facilitated the commission of 
financial crimes, such as money laundering, corruption and financial frauds, beyond national 
border. A financial crime now may occur in more than one national territory. The emergence 
of transnational financial crimes has necessitated States to establish adequate extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in order to eliminate “havens” for the offenders. 
National criminal jurisdiction includes: firstly, prescriptive (or legislative) jurisdiction, 
which denotes the authority of a State to criminalize a given form of conduct; secondly, 
executive jurisdiction (or enforcement jurisdiction), which indicates the power of national law 
enforcement agencies to investigate, arrest, detain, prosecute and confiscate the criminal 
proceeds; and thirdly, adjudicative jurisdiction over a criminal case. Driven by the principle of 
sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States, in general criminal jurisdiction is 
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facultative rather than mandatory. The exercise of criminal jurisdiction is ultimately a matter 
for individual States.  
Nevertheless, the gravity of transnational crime has forced States to join different 
international conventions in order to set up regulations of establishing national jurisdiction over 
the certain criminal offences. These regulations are stated in article 4 of United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 Vienna 
Convention) (UN, 1988), article 15 of United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) (UN, 2000), and article 42 of United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) (UN, 2003). These frameworks provide for both 
binding and permissive jurisdiction. Accordingly, the State Parties “shall” assert its jurisdiction 
over the given offences based upon the principle of strict territoriality or “quasi- 
territoriality”[1], and “may” extend its jurisdiction over such offences in several ways beyond 
their territory, known as extraterritorial jurisdiction. Although the assertion of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over the given offences is necessary to prevent the offenders from utilizing national 
borders for the avoidance of prosecution, it is optional.  
The general permissive bases for establishing national criminal jurisdiction include: 
territoriality and its variations, nationality (or active personality), passive personality, 
protective principle, and universality. In addition, the exercise of jurisdiction over transnational 
crime should have to satisfy certain further conditions and principles, of which the double/dual 
criminality and the principle of non bis in idem (or prohibition of double jeopardy in common 
law States) are the most important. However, the application of these principles and conditions 
varies upon different type of transnational crime with its own characteristics and constituent 
elements, and sometimes is controversial. 
The term “transnational crime” was first used by the United Nations (UN) Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Branch at the Fifth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and 
Treatment of Offenders (1975) “in order to identify certain criminal phenomena transcending 
international borders, transgressing the laws of several states or having an impact on any 
countries” (Mueller, 2001, p. 272). In the Fourth UN Survey of Crime Trends and Operations 
of Criminal Justice System (1995), transnational crimes were described as “offences whose 
inception, perpetration and/or direct or indirect effect involved more than one country” [2]. 
Following this approach, article 3(2) of the Palermo Convention provides that an offence is 
“transnational” in nature if it satisfies one of the following features: a) it is committed in more 
than one State; b) it is committed in one state but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, 
direction or control takes place in another State; c) it is committed in one state but involves an 
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organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one state; or d) it is 
committed in one state but has substantial effects in another state. It should be noted that the 
adjective “transnational” usually implies cross-frontier activities, however entirely intra-
national offence may be justified as “transnational” offence, for example if it belongs to 
category (d) of the Palermo Convention provision. 
This article examines and discusses how a State establishes criminal jurisdiction over 
transnational financial crimes, with the focus on transnational money laundering and 
transnational bribery. This paper is structured in three parts: i) the general concept of 
transnational money laundering and transnational bribery; ii) the bases and principles on which 
a State can claim criminal jurisdiction over these offences; ii) the application of jurisdictional 
conditions in a transnational context; and iii) how to deal with the particular problems arising 
from national claim of jurisdiction over these offences, e.g., jurisdictional concurrent.   
 
2. Transnational money laundering 
Despite different definitions, money laundering is generally understood as the process of 
converting the proceeds derived from underlying criminal offences, called predicate offences, 
to apparently legitimate property [3]. 
The conduct elements of money laundering are spelled out in article 3(1)(b) of the 1988 
Vienna Convention), article 6(1) of the Palermo Convention, and article 23(1) of UNCAC as 
follows: 
 
(a) (i) [T]he conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime, for 
the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of helping any person who is 
involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her action; 
(ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition movement or ownership 
of or rights with respect to property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime; 
(b) Subject to the basic concept of its legal system: 
(i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property is the 
proceeds of crime. 
(ii) Participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, 
facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with this 
article. 
 
Article 3(3) of the 1988 Vienna Convention and article 6(2)(f) of the Palermo Convention 
provides the mens rea of money laundering with two central elements: the intent to commit the 
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conduct elements of the offence, and knowing that the property is derived from the predicate 
offences or from an act of participating in such activities (known as the “knowledge” element).  
It should be noticed that there is no money laundering offence without a predicate offence. 
Article 6(2)(c) of UNCAC stipulate that “predicate offences shall include offences committed 
both within and outside the jurisdiction of the State Party in question”.  
States categorize predicate offences for money laundering differently. For example, New 
Zealand categorizes all criminal offences as predicate offences. Section 243(1) of Crimes Act 
1961, states that a predicate offence is “an offence (or any offence described as a crime) that is 
punishable under New Zealand law, including any act, wherever committed, that would be an 
offence in New Zealand if committed in New Zealand”. In Australia, predicate offences are all 
indictable offences [4]. Under Australian law, an indictable offence is one with a penalty of a 
minimum of 12 months imprisonment. The United States (US) refers to a specific list of 
predicate offences [5]. According to section 261(1) of the "Strafgesetzbuch” [Criminal Code] 
(Germany), the predicate offences for money laundering in Germany cover all serious offenses 
plus a number of specifically listed misdemeanors.  
For the discussion of jurisdiction in this paper, a money laundering offence is considered to 
be “transnational” if: i) it has one of the alternative features of transnational offences provided 
for in article 3(2) of the Palermo Convention; or ii) when the predicate offence was committed 
abroad. It is noticeable that scenario (i) and (ii) may overlap. Under  scenario (ii), in the 
circumstance when the predicate oofence occurred and generated the proceeds abroad, the 
money laundering activity is actually trans-boundary in nature, because the proceeds has been 
transferred out of the original country. In other circumstances, the nature of the money 
laundering activity itself may be not transnational, but the investigation and prosecution for the 
money laundering activity may require interstate cooperation. For example, the cross-border 
predicate oofence was committed in State A and involved State B, the proceeds was produced 
and purely laundered in State B. Then if State B wishes to establish its jurisdiction over the 
money laundering activity, it usually must ensure that the predicate activity constitutes a crime 
under its law. For doing so, State B needs the cooperation from State A, such as exchanging 
information or evidence about the predicate activity. 
 
3. Transnational bribery 
Transnational bribery occurs when a person (natural or legal) from one country (the home 
country) bribes a public official of another country (the host country) (Nichols, 1999, pp. 258-
59). Transnational bribery has been recognized as an increasing problem in international 
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business transactions which harms both home countries (normally developed countries) and 
host countries (usually developing countries) (Obidairo, 2013, pp. 35-36). As a result, various 
bilateral and multilateral legal instruments, which oblige their State Parties to criminalize the 
activity of bribing foreign public officials, have been formulated to regulate and suppress 
transnational bribery. Most States have criminalized bribery and many have made the bribery 
of foreign public officials a criminal offence. Article 1(1) of the Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention) 
and article 16(1) of UNCAC state as follows: 
 
Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a 
criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the promise, offering or giving to a foreign public official 
or an official of a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the 
official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in 
the exercise of his or her official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other undue advantage in 
relation to the conduct of international business. 
 
Article 2(b) of UNCAC defines a foreign public official as “any person holding a legislative, 
executive, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; 
and any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency 
or public enterprise”. 
 
4. Establishing criminal jurisdiction over transnational financial crimes 
As noted earlier, State Parties to the 1988 Vienna Convention, the Palermo Convention, and 
UNCAC (hereafter called “suppression conventions”) “shall” and “may” establish their 
jurisdiction over certain offences, based on basic principles of: territoriality and its variations, 
nationality, passive personality, protective principle, and universality. Nevertheless, not all 
these principles are applicable to the establishment of jurisdiction over transnational money 
laundering or bribery.  
The passive personality principle, which grants jurisdiction to the State of which the victim 
is a national, does not work in case of bribery and money laundering offences since victims of 
these offences can hardly be individualized.  
The protective principle, which gives a State criminal jurisdiction over exterritorial conduct 
of aliens that violates the vital protected national interests of that State, seems not to be 
applicable to bribery and money laundering offences. Because it is difficult to prove whether 
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bribery or money laundering committed abroad by aliens injures vital protected national 
interests.  
When it comes to the absolute universality principle, this principle grants every State 
jurisdiction over an offender founded in the territory of that State, provided that the offence 
committed by the offender must belong to the category of jus cogens international crimes (e.g., 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes) (Bassiouni, 2002, p. 82), regardless of 
where the offence is committed. Neither bribery nor money laundering offences are among 
these offences, thus this principle is of no use in respect of these offences. 
The discussion of this paper now focuses mainly on the jurisdictional principles provided 
for in the suppression conventions, as these conventions all contain obligations to the 
jurisdictional aspects of transnational bribery and money laundering, and most States are now 
Parties to them. 
 
4.1 Territoriality and its variations 
Criminal jurisdiction is primarily territorial or, in other words, based upon the principle of 
territoriality. This principle is accepted as the most substantial basis for a State to claim criminal 
jurisdiction over an offence committed within its own territory. The suppression conventions 
all require each State Party to establish jurisdiction over bribery and money laundering 
offences, upon the strict territorial or “quasi-territorial” basis. Article 15(1) of the Palermo 
Convention states: 
 
Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the 
offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this Convention when: 
(a) The offence is committed in the territory of that State Party; or 
(b) The offence is committed on board a vessel that is flying the flag of that State Party or an aircraft that 
is registered under the laws of that State Party at the time that the offence is committed. 
 
Nonetheless, a transnational crime often occurs in more than one State, therefore, the 
concerned questions are which State’s territory the crime is considered to have been committed, 
and thus, which State may exercise territorial jurisdiction over the crime. In practice, a crime 
is usually considered to be committed in the territory of a State when only one or some 
constituent elements of the crime actually occurred within the territory of that State. These 
elements can be the acts or results of the crime. The territorial jurisdiction has been variably 
expanded in its application to the establishment of jurisdiction over transnational crime. The 
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State Parties have employed various approaches in establishing their broad territorial 
jurisdiction (Blakesley and Lagodny, 1991, p. 73).  
Given the concepts of transnational bribery and money laundering offences, these offences 
can be conceived of as “conduct offences” and not as “result offences”. The harmful effect of 
bribery and money laundering offences is usually not a constituent element of the offences. 
Thus, every State, on whose territory a conduct element of bribery or money laundering 
offences occurred, can claim jurisdiction over the entire offence. 
Under 18 USC § 1956(a)(2), the US exercises territorial jurisdiction over anyone who 
“transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit, or transfer a monetary 
instrument or funds from a place in the US to or through a place outside the US or to a place 
in the US from or through a place outside the US”. In addition, under 18 USC § 1956(f), there 
is territorial jurisdiction over the money laundering offence committed by a non-US citizen 
which occurs in part in the US and involves funds or monetary instruments of a value exceeding 
US$10,000, even if the defendant has not been physically present in the US during the 
commission of the offence. Accordingly, a foreign citizen, who makes a wire (or by other 
means) transfer of funds from or to the US while being abroad, is deemed to have acted “in 
part” in the US. In United States v. Stein [6], the defendant, who initiated a transfer of funds 
from a place within the US to a place abroad without the physical presence in US, is subject to 
territorial jurisdiction.  
Generally, under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), the US asserts 
territorial jurisdiction over conduct both inside and outside its territoriality. Foreign persons 
may be prosecuted for using the US mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce or to do any other act in furtherance of bribery of a foreign official [7]. 15 USC §§ 
78dd-2(h)(5) defines “interstate commerce” as “trade, commerce, transportation, or 
communication among the several States, or between any foreign country and any State or 
between any State and any place or ship outside thereof….”. 
Canada can claim territorial jurisdiction over a transnational financial crime committed by 
a foreign citizen and occurred entirely outside Canada, provided that there is a “real and 
substantial connection” between the crime and Canada. In R. v. Karigar [8], the defendant was 
convicted of agreeing with others to offer bribes to foreign public officials under the old version 
of the Corruption of Foreign Public Official Act (Canada). Although the offence occurred in 
other States (the US and India) and no constituent element existed in Canada, the court still 
established territorial jurisdiction over the case because it proved that there was a “real and 
substantial connection” between the offence and Canada. In this case, the defendant was a 
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Canadian resident for many years and was employed by or/and acted as an agent of a Canadian 
Company. This application is consistent with Commentaries on the OECD Convention, which 
states that “the territorial basis for jurisdiction should be interpreted broadly so that an 
extensive physical connection to the bribery act is not required” (OECD, 2011).  
The territorial theory is also applied to the offences enumerated in article 15(2)(ii) of the 
Palermo Convention which are actually a type of conduct falling under money laundering 
offences - “participation in, association with, conspiracy,…”. Accordingly, a State Party may 
establish jurisdiction over any of these offences committed outside its territory with a view to 
the commission of money laundering offences within its territory.  
 
4.2 Nationality principle 
Under the nationality principle, a State is entitled to assert criminal jurisdiction over an 
accused who is its nationals, even when he/she is found outside their territory, and even when 
the perpetrator is no longer a national or has only become a national after committing crime 
(Ryngaert, 2008, p. 88). From the perspective of international law, this principle is underpinned 
by the rationale that a State retains its sovereignty over its nationals, even though they are 
traveling or residing abroad, and retains its respect internationally by punishing its own 
wrongdoers (Blakesley and Lagodny, 1991, p. 25). A State can, based on allegiance, assert 
criminal jurisdiction over the acts of one of its nationals deemed criminal under that State’s 
laws (Bassiouni, 1986, p. 23).  
In accordance with jurisdictional provisions in the suppression conventions, such as article 
42(2)(b) of UNCAC, State Parties may establish extraterritorial jurisdiction over bribery and 
money laundering offences committed abroad by their own nationals. Under these provisions, 
unlike the strict territoriality principle, the nationality principle is optional rather than 
mandatory. An extended application of the nationality principle is the permissive establishment 
of jurisdiction over habitual residents. Article 15(2)(b) of the Palermo Convention and article 
42(2)(b) of UNCAC provides that a State Party may establish jurisdiction when “the offence 
is committed by a national of that State Party or a stateless person who has his or her habitual 
residence in its territory”. 
Although the nationality principle is universally recognized, its application varies 
significantly from State to State. Continental law States apply the national principle in a 
substantially expansive manner. Section 7(2)1 of the German Criminal Code states that 
“German criminal law shall apply to other offences committed abroad if the act is a criminal 
offence at the locality of its commission or if that locality is not subject to any criminal law 
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jurisdiction, and if the offender was German at the time of the offence or became German after 
the commission”. 
On the other hand, common law States have traditionally been reluctant to apply this 
principle. States limit the application of nationality principle to given offences because of 
numerous reasons. One of the reasons is that the territorial and nationality principle and the 
incidence of dual nationality create parallel jurisdictions and possible double jeopardy 
(Brownlie, 2008, p. 304). Under section 7A of Crimes Act 1961, New Zealand applies the 
principle to certain offences with transnational aspects, excluding money laundering. The US 
exercises its jurisdiction on the nationality principle over a relatively small number of offences, 
which impact on some important State interest, including money laundering offences [9]. 
Canada also applies the nationality principle to money laundering offences. In R. v. Hape [10], 
Canadian courts, based on the nationality principle, convicted a Canadian businessman of 
money laundering in associated with an investment company located in the Turks and Caicos 
Island. With the permission from the Turks and Caicos Islands, Canadian authorities had 
conducted parts of their investigation on the Islands, such as searched the accused’s office and 
gathered the documentary evidence. 
Upon on the nationality principle, 15 USC §§ 78dd-2(i) allows the US to exercise 
jurisdiction over US nationals and companies, who committed the offence of transnational 
bribery wholly outside the US. In Canada, under section 5(2) of the new version of the 
Corruption of Foreign Public Official Act (implemented on 19 June 2013), Canadian citizens, 
permanent residents or companies can be prosecuted for transnational bribery regardless of a 
crime’s link to Canada.    
It is worth mentioning that the application of nationality principle to a foreign corporate 
crime is controversial in practice. The problems relate to determining nationality and legal 
status of corporation (whether corporation is recognized), whether the State involved accept 
corporate criminality, and the condition of double criminality if required. In fact, because there 
is no international unification of rules for the award of nationality of a corporation, the same 
corporation may have different nationalities. Common law States usually adhere to the rule that 
corporation is granted the nationality of the State under whose law it has been incorporated. 
Another approach (used by France and Germany) is to determine a corporate entity’s 
nationality based upon its principal centre of business (Stessens, 2000, pp. 233-34). 
 
4.3  Aut Dedere Aut Judicare Principle 
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The aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute) principle refers to the alternative 
obligation to extradite or prosecute, which is often contained in multilateral treaties to secure 
the prosecution for the crime of international concern (Bassiouni and Wise, 1995, p. 3). It 
generally obliges a State Party, in whose territory an alleged offender is found, either to 
extradite the offender (if it does not prosecute) to another State Party which is prepared to try 
him, or to prosecute him before its own competent authorities (if it does not extradite because 
of certain grounds). In order to do so, this principle actually imposes two legal obligations on 
State Parties: i) to set up their law that if they refuse/fail to extradite, they must establish their 
own jurisdiction; and ii) to exercise that jurisdiction in a particular case if they refuse/fail to 
extradite.  
Included in the suppression conventions, aut dedere aut judicare can operate in a case of 
exercising executive jurisdiction over transnational money laundering and bribery. Assuming 
that an alleged offender, who is a national living in State B, committed a money laundering 
offence involving State A. State A has established its jurisdiction over that money laundering 
offence on the basis, e.g., of the principle of territoriality. State B, aware of State A’s 
jurisdiction, has found the alleged offender in its territory. State A makes an extradition request 
to State B. If State B refuses to extradite, e.g., on the ground that the alleged offender is its 
national, State B must “submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution”, given that State B has law which enables it to exercise jurisdiction in such a 
situation. 
The operation of this principle is usually conditional. Usually the requested State is bound 
to initiate the prosecution over the offences provided for in the suppression conventions 
(including money laundering and corruption) if the extradition is refused only on the certain 
grounds. Those grounds are listed in article 4(2)(a) of the 1988 Vienna Convention: when the 
offence has been committed in its territory or on board a vessel flying its flag or an aircraft 
which was registered under its law at the time the offence was committed; or when the offence 
has been committed by one of its nationals; and in article 16(10) of the Palermo Convention 
(only when an alleged offender is one of its nationals). If the grounds, upon which the 
extradition is refused, are other than these, the requested State is under no mandatory obligation 
to initiate the prosecution. 
According to the wording of “submit” in article 6(9) of the 1988 Vienna Convention and 
article 16(10) of the Palermo Convention, once the requested State establishes the jurisdiction, 
there is no mandatory obligation to actually prosecute. The requested State remains free to 
exercise its criminal jurisdiction subject to its domestic law. It is only required to “take their 
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decision and conduct their proceedings in the same manner as in the case of any other offence 
of a grave nature under the domestic law”. 
 
5. Jurisdictional conditions in a transnational context 
5.1 Double/dual criminality 
The condition of dual/double criminality is traditionally bound up with the basic areas of 
international criminal law: extradition, the transfer of criminal proceedings and the execution 
of foreign sentences (Gardocki, 1993, p. 9). With the development of international cooperation 
in the fight against transnational crime, this condition has been perceived as one of the most 
crucial and universal conditions applied to jurisdiction, extradition and mutual legal assistance 
However, the double criminality condition is not a rule of customary international law. States 
are not automatically obliged to apply this condition in their mutual relations unless it is 
provided for in their treaties or domestic laws (Swart, 1996, p. 520). In general, this condition, 
in both cases of mutual legal assistance and jurisdiction, is fulfilled when the act is punishable 
under the criminal laws of both States.  
The requirement of double criminality as a condition to jurisdiction relates to the question 
of whether the act is punishable under the law of the place of commission (lex loci delicti). The 
rationales behind this condition are derived primarily from State sovereignty, international 
solidarity and the legality principle (Wyngaert, 1996, pp. 140-42). When a crime is committed 
in State A and prosecuted in State B, the court in State B would, if applying the condition, raise 
a central question whether the act is punishable also under the law of State A. In specific 
situations, double criminality can be justified in abstracto or in concreto. Generally speaking, 
double criminality in abstracto is fulfilled when there is merely the existence of criminalization 
of the act under the criminal laws of both States concerned. In a further consideration, some 
commentators suggest that double criminality in abstracto should comprise three cumulative 
components (Feller, 1975, p. 70): i) the existence of a legal norm prohibiting the act in both 
States; ii) the act is punishable in both States, in respect of the law applicable at the time the 
act was committed as compared with the law applicable at the time of the legal proceedings; 
and iii) the act is punishable under the laws of both States in respect of the place where the act 
was committed. Double criminality in concreto goes beyond the fulfillment of double 
criminality in abstracto. It includes the elements of double criminality in abstracto illustrated 
above, and takes into account the concrete circumstances of the act from the point of view of 
criminality liability, such as: age and sanity of the doer, various grounds for the negation and 
exemption of criminal liability (Feller, 1975, p. 71).  
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The concern about double criminality of the predicate crime as a requirement for jurisdiction 
over money laundering will arise when the jurisdiction asserted by a State over the money 
laundering offence requires a link to the specific predicate crime, and this predicate crime was 
not committed in that State. Specifically, the question is when State A asserts jurisdiction over 
a money laundering act that involves the proceeds from the predicate crime committed in State 
B, whether State A should require double criminality of the predicate crime in order to establish 
its jurisdiction.  
One of the issues, that have to be proved when asserting jurisdiction over the money 
laundering act, is that the property laundered must originally be criminal proceeds. In the above 
hypothetical case, under the criminal law of State B, obviously, the proceeds are criminally 
generated from the predicate criminal activity which occurred in State B. Furthermore, when 
State A establishes jurisdiction over the money laundering act that it may do so, this predicate 
activity should also constitute a criminal offence under the law of State A. State A should 
require double criminality in respect of the predicate crime to secure the legality principle. 
Nevertheless, it is optional according to the suppression conventions. For example, article 6(c) 
of the Palermo Convention states that “[O]ffences committed outside the jurisdiction of the 
State Party shall constitute predicate offences only when the relevant conduct is a criminal 
offence under the domestic law of the State where it is committed and would be a criminal 
offence in the domestic law of the State Party implementing or applying this article had it been 
committed there”.  
In the practice of prosecution for money laundering offences, it is burdensome to prove the 
precise criminal origin of proceeds generated from a predicate crime in concerto. Especially, 
when defendants are third parties (i.e. the criminal proceeds are laundered by persons who are 
not involved in the commission of the predicate offence); or advanced and complicated money 
laundering typologies, such as the extensive use of shell companies or cyber-laundering, are 
used to hide the trails of criminal proceeds [11]. In many countries, e.g., Australia and New 
Zealand, proof of a specific predicate offence is not required [12]. Hence, most States, in the 
same situation as State A (where the money laundering offence occurs), only require double 
criminality of the predicate crime in abstracto for the prosecution of the money laundering 
offence under its law (Durrieu, 2013, pp. 407-08). However, Russia still adopts the in concreto 
approach (Reynolds, 2003, p. 20). It can be seen that, in order to succeed in a jurisdictional 
claim over transnational money laundering cases, States should ‘relax’ the requirement of 




5.2 Non Bis In Idem in a transnational context 
The recognition of multiple principles for the exercise of jurisdiction over transnational 
crime may lead to the situation in which the conduct in question is subject to the concurrent 
criminal jurisdiction of two or more Sates. In this situation, the transnational application of the 
non bis in idem principle [13], a continental equivalent of the common law principle against 
double jeopardy (Sigler, 1963, pp. 283-99), functions as a bar to new prosecution or 
enforcement of penalties for the same offender (enforcement jurisdiction). 
The principle of non bis in idem is traditionally applied to purely domestic justice as a 
fundamental procedural safeguard for defendants facing criminal proceedings. The application 
of non bis in idem at a national level is also provided for in article 14(7) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as follows: “[N]o one shall be liable to be tried or 
punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence 
for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and 
penal procedure of that State” [14]. This principle is especially emphasized in case law in many 
different States. Once a case has been disposed of, it should not be reopened; and, the final 
outcome of a judicial proceeding should be respected and accepted by other courts (the doctrine 
of res judicata) (Wyngaert and Stessens, 1999, p. 781).  
The transnational application of non bis in idem was initiated by member States of the 
European Communities in 1987 through the Convention between the Member States of the 
European Communities on Double Jeopardy. Article 54 of the Schengen Implementation 
Agreement (1990) provides that “a person who has been finally judged by a Contracting Party 
may not be prosecuted by another Contracting Party for the same offences provided that, where 
he is sentenced, the sentence has been served or is currently being served or can no longer be 
carried out under the sentencing laws of the Contracting Party”. Eurojust [15] also implies the 
non bis in idem principle in its guidance to deal with the jurisdictional concurrence in cross-
border cases (Eurojust, 2016). Nevertheless, many continental law States (among many others) 
do not recognize the res judicata effect of foreign criminal judgments. Only some European 
States, which are Parties to the Schengen Implementation Agreement, recognize this effect.  
The cross-border application of non bis in idem is controversial and limited. Controversy 
surrounding the recognition of foreign judgment on transnational crime is a primary hindrance 
to the application. Specifically, if authorities of one State take judicial steps against the alleged 
perpetrator of a transnational crime, will the outcomes of this procedure be recognized or 
binding on the concerned judicial bodies of the other States which also assert jurisdiction over 
the transnational crime? In addition, some States tend to apply the non bis in idem principle in 
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abstracto, whereas others prefer the in concreto application (Conway, 2003, pp. 227-28). In 
practice, because there is no concrete provision of international law that makes the principle of 
non bis in idem mandatory at the international level [16], States are often reluctant to recognize 
the validity of a foreign criminal judgment on the crime that happened in their territory (Gless, 
2017, pp. 228-31). The recognition is normally based on bilateral or multilateral treaties dealing 
with judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Vervaele, 2013, p. 229). In particular, common 
law States are normally unsure if States from other legal traditions adhere to the rules of 
evidence in a common law criminal trial. While some civil law States, such as Netherland, 
Spain, France, Belgium and Switzerland, recognize a res judicata effect of foreign criminal 
judgments; others, e.g., Germany, do not (Gless, 2017, pp. 229-31). 
 
6. Dealing with concurrent jurisdiction 
6.1 International provisions 
In a case of transnational crime, the States concerned can assume their jurisdiction over the 
crime based upon the different aforementioned principles. Nevertheless, neither general 
international law nor the suppression conventions provide a hierarchical application of 
jurisdictional principles. Thus, States normally do not have to struggle with the question of 
whether their own law permits them to establish jurisdiction over the crime, but rather which 
of the competing States has the most appropriate jurisdiction. In practice, although it is difficult 
to give detailed guidelines or mechanisms for prioritizing concurrent criminal jurisdiction 
claims at the international level, some suggestions have been given. The suppression 
conventions, such as article 21 of the Palermo Convention, suggest that “States Parties shall 
consider the possibility of transferring to one another proceedings for the prosecution of an 
offence established in accordance with this Convention in cases where such transfer is 
considered to be in the interests of the proper administration of justice, in particular in cases 
where several jurisdictions are involved, with a view to concentrating the prosecution”. In 
another approach, Eurojust suggests that a prosecution should take place in the State “where 
the majority of the criminality occurred or where the majority of the loss was sustained”, and 
that a number of listed factors should be taken into account in making the final decision as to  
which State is the most appropriate forum for a prosecution (Eurojust, 2016, pp. 2-4). In 
addition, the UN’s report on economic fraud also recommends elaborate criteria which should 
be considered to decide the most convenient forum for the prosecution for transnational frauds, 
when more than one State have jurisdiction and want to prosecute (UN, 2007, pp. 17-19). These 
criteria are:  
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(a) The State which has suffered from the greatest direct and indirect harm. Harm 
provides incentive and justification for the prosecution. This State also usually has available 
evidence;  
(b) The State in which most of the elements of the offence were committed; 
(c) The State that has the greatest investment for investigative efforts in the case. 
This State usually has the commitment of resources and more evidence for prosecution; 
(d) The location of witnesses and evidence. Transferring evidence may cost 
significantly, and may affect the legal admissibility of the evidence; 
(e) The State that has the strongest case;  
(f) The State with the best capacity. States with extensive experience and resources 
may take prosecution, if that is legally feasible, or assist another State that has a claim but 
less capacity; 
(g) The nationality of the offender and whether he or she can be extradited;  
(h) Other offences involved or which may be prosecuted;  
(i) Other offenders that are involved or may be prosecuted; 
(j) The respective sentencing regimes. States are normally willing to cede 
jurisdiction to other States with similar punishment for the crime committed. 
The UN’s recommendation can be used when dealing with jurisdictional concurrence over 
other transnational crimes, such as bribery and money laundering. The suggestion and 
recommendation appears to indicate a tendency towards the application of the conflict of laws 
approach, such as the “centre of gravity” principle (Boister, 2018, p. 171) and the forum non 
conveniens doctrine [17], to resolving instances of competing jurisdiction over transnational 
crime. The above-listed factors should be considered as criteria for determine the “centre of 
gravity” or the most convenient forum for prosecution of transnational bribery or money 
laundering offences.  
In practice, whatever factors are ultimately employed to justify the States’ interests in the 
prosecution, negotiation and cooperation between the States involved is essential for evaluating 
and balancing those factors, then to reach a decision where to prosecute. The requirement of 
consultation and coordination is also provided for in the suppression conventions, e.g., in article 
15(5) of the Palermo Convention. The relevant States authorities should also consult with each 
other about the substance and procedure of prosecution, such as the application of any 
procedural defences or the allocation of cases. For example, in United States of America v. 
Cotroni; United States of America v. El Zein [18], the US and Canada both wants to prosecute 
two fugitives for offences relating to conspiracy to import and distribute heroin in the US.  The 
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Court acknowledged the challenges of transnational crime and adopted the list of criteria that 
should be taken into consideration when dealing with concurrent jurisdiction. The Court held 
that in practice, deciding whether to prosecute or extradite, is made after consultations on the 
relevant factors between the domestic relevant authorities in both states. The Crown 
Prosecution Service of England & Wales (CPS) has also published guidelines on the handling 
of cases where the jurisdiction to prosecute is shared with prosecuting authorities overseas 
(CPS, 2013). Accordingly, prosecutors and investigators of the relevant jurisdictions should 
meet in person to consider and balance the different factors when reaching a decision where to 
prosecute. 
The International Association of Prosecutors (IAP), in its guidelines for cases of concurrent 
jurisdiction, highlights the importance of comprehensive multilateral consultations and 
recommends venues facilitating the meetings (IAP, 2013, p. 9). Meetings should be arranged 
at a mutually agreed venue between nominated senior prosecutors representing each 
jurisdiction involved. The determination should be reached together with all relevant 
authorities in each jurisdiction in accordance with any relevant bilateral, regional and 
international legal frameworks. The international and regional organisations, to which involved 
States are their members, can assist with consultations (e.g., the International Criminal Police 
Organization (INTERPOL), Eurojust, European Judicial Network (EJN), Organization of 
American States (OAS), Ibero-American Association of Public Prosecutors (IberRed), 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)). 
What we could see from the above guidelines is that States with insufficient legal 
frameworks and resources would have a weak claim in competing jurisdiction over 
transnational crime.  
 
6.2 Settlement agreements on the prosecution of corporate financial crimes 
While settlement agreements in criminal proceedings are foreign to many countries, some 
countries, e.g., the US and the UK, have an established tradition of using plea bargain. When 
it comes to settlement agreements on the prosecution of commercial organizations committed 
financial crimes (e.g., corruption), the US and the UK are still the forerunners.  The deferred 
prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) are used by the US 
Department of Justice (DOJ) or the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Under 
these agreements, a company must comply with certain conditions, e.g., financial penalties, to 
be exempted from being prosecuted for certain financial offences, which include transnational 
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bribery (SEC, 2016). DPAs are also used by the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) [19]. 
Accordingly, a UK deferred prosecution agreement refers to “an agreement reached between a 
prosecutor and an organisation, which could be prosecuted, under the supervision of a judge. 
The agreement allows a prosecution to be suspended for a defined period provided the 
organisation meets certain specified condition. DPAs can be used for fraud, bribery and other 
economic crime”. DPAs would enable prosecutors to secure penalties for and the surrendering 
of the proceeds of wrongdoing, and providing benefits for victims, without the uncertainty, 
expense, complexity or length of a full criminal trial. They also enable companies to be held to 
account, but without unfairly affecting employees, customers, pensioners, suppliers and 
investors who were not involved in the behaviour that is being penalised (UK, 2012, p. 4). In 
addition, this approach could enhance prosecutors’ ability to detect and pursue transnational 
financial crime committed by commercial organisations (UK, 2012, p. 6). Transnational nature 
of the crime was often the cause of long, expensive and complicated criminal proceedings, 
especially the potential concurrent jurisdiction. 
 
6.3 Hypothetical case study of transnational money laundering 
Let us assume that Mr X, who is a national of State A, has participated in the transnational 
money laundering offence involving conduct in State B and State C. He travels to State B to 
commit an act of money laundering. In State B, he deposits illegal funds in banks, and then he 
transfers these funds through accounts at various banks in State B. Finally, the funds are 
transferred and integrated in State C, for example, by investing them in real estate. The fund 
transactions are mainly carried out by the internet banking. It appears that States A, B and C 
each have jurisdiction over the “same” conduct of “transferring illegal fund knowing that such 
fund is the proceeds of crime” which results in the “same” money laundering offence. States B 
and C can each establish jurisdiction to adjudicate on Mr X for the “same” money laundering 
offence based upon the territoriality principle. In addition, State A may impose jurisdiction to 
adjudicate on Mr X based upon the principle of nationality. In this hypothetical case, there is a 
potential situation of concurrent jurisdiction where more than one State claim jurisdiction over 
the same offender or offence. Assuming that States A, B and C each seek to prosecute Mr X 
for the “same” offence based upon the principle of territoriality or nationality, this situation 
will be discussed hereinafter.  
In practice, the principle of non bis in idem should be applied to this transnational context, 
as a result Mr X should not be prosecuted for the “same” offence sequentially by different 
States. It is also necessary to address the issue of prioritizing the claims of competing 
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jurisdiction over the same money laundering offender or offence. More specifically, how and 
which factors should be considered to determine the most appropriate State for prosecution? 
In the above case, subject to the UN’s suggestion (UN, 2007), custody of the offender and 
nationality of the offender can be factors that are in favour of awarding jurisdictional priority. 
Assuming that Mr X is apprehended in State C; rationally, on the basis that there is evidence 
indicating he has committed money laundering in State C, State C should be given the first 
opportunity to prosecute Mr X. If other States are satisfied with the outcome of prosecution 
conducted by State C, they should not pursue their own prosecutions. But what if Mr X travels 
to State C, commits a money laundering offence, and then returns to State A? In such a 
situation, both State A and State C have jurisdiction over the conduct in question and can 
prosecute Mr X. Both State A and C may want to prosecute Mr X. Under aut dedere aut 
judicare , State A shall either extradite Mr X to State C for prosecution or prosecute him itself. 
Traditionally, Mr X’s nationality weighs heavily in favour of granting prosecution to State A. 
Another significant factor should be taken into account is the place for prosecution of the 
predicate offence. The State, which prosecutes both the money laundering offence and its 
predicate offence, may arguably have a weightier claim to go first. In the situation where a 
State with a weaker legal basis has invested more resources into the investigation and has 
greater capacity, such State may have a better claim. 
In brief, the principle of territoriality is the predominant principle for the assertion of 
jurisdiction over transnational money laundering. This principle is given priority over other 
bases, such as nationality and aut dedere aut judicare principle. While the application of the 
territoriality principle is widely mandatory, the application of other principles is optional, 
limited or discretionary.  
The nature of transnational money laundering offences potentially leads to problems of 
concurrent jurisdiction over the “same” money laundering offence. The priority of a 
jurisdictional claim depends on the combination of convincing grounds in particular cases. In 
some circumstances, a State which combines territorial jurisdiction with custody of the 
offenders should have the better claim. In others, the combination of nationality principle and 
custody of offender should have the priority. In addition, in some cases, the State, where the 
predicate crime was committed or prosecuted, should be favoured. However, in practice, States 
traditionally first proceed with consultation and negotiation in dealing with the jurisdictional 





The emergence of transnational money laundering and bribery offences has necessitated the 
extension of national criminal jurisdiction beyond national boundaries over those offences. 
States should establish adequate criminal jurisdiction over these transnational offences to 
eliminate “havens” for the offenders. In order to avoid controversial unilateral assertion of their 
jurisdiction, States have agreed on a number of principles based on which their jurisdiction 
over the transnational offences is established. By adopting the suppression conventions, the 
State Parties are provided with both the mandatory and optional jurisdictional principles for 
transnational financial offences. Territoriality, nationality and aut dedere aut judicare are the 
possible bases for the establishment of jurisdiction over money laundering and bribery 
offences. Due to some weaknesses of the nationality and aut dedere aut judicare principle, 
such as the problems of dual nationality or nationality of corporations, the principle of 
territoriality enjoys the predominant role as it has done traditionally. In fact, States often apply 
these jurisdictional principles in combination rather alone. In addition, the assertion of 
territorial jurisdiction over a money laundering offence should take account of double 
criminality of the predicate offence and non bis in idem. When the jurisdictional concurrence 
occurs, the involved countries should consult one another with taking into account of a number 
of relevant factors and take the “centre of gravity” approach to deciding which State or forum 
eventually prosecute. Less-favoured States are often those which have a weak legal basis and/or 
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